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Abstract
This paper uses data from freelancer.com – an online platform that allows
employers and freelancers to search for, and match with, each other – to study
the effect of freelancers’ country of origin on their likelihood to be hired. Hav-
ing to rely on a relatively small number of characteristics, employers use the
freelancer’s country of origin to infer the expected service’s quality. This set-
ting also allows me to document how employers’ experience in past hires affects
their behavior in current hires. I find that freelancers from developing coun-
tries are less likely to be hired when they have no individual reputation, and
as individual reputation becomes better this country effect disappears. I show
that following a good match with a freelancer, employers are more likely to hire
freelancers from the good match’s country. These these findings are consistent
with statistical – rather than purely taste-based – discrimination.
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1 Introduction
I study how employers and freelancers from all over the world interact in an on-
line website that facilitates searching and matching. The platform I study – free-
lancer.com – allows individuals to take advantage of the large wage gaps across
countries, generating a single global labor market defined by occupation and free
of location considerations.
Traditionally, the search for prospective employees was geographically concen-
trated near the employer. The rise of the Internet allowed online marketplaces
such as freelancer.com to evolve and facilitate search for employees anywhere on
the globe. Employers in such online platforms inevitably face the problem of infer-
ring prospective employees’ (freelancers’ henceforth) productivity without meeting
them in person. One salient feature from which employers infer the expected
quality is the freelancers’ country. If employers associate freelancers from partic-
ular countries with higher expected productivity, they will be more likely to choose
freelancers from such countries. Therefore, while a programmer in India may earn
only one-tenth of what a programmer in the U.S does, American employers may
still be reluctant to hire freelancers from a developing country.
I was granted access to a copy of the database that is used for the operation of
freelancer.com. The database contains both public and non-public data recorded
from user activity. Specifically, it contains information on employers, freelancers,
projects, bids, reviews, etc.1
This paper is divided into two parts. Since this is among the first papers on on-
line labor markets, the first part of the paper describes some of the main patterns
that characterize user activity on it. I start by showing that the most popular types
of jobs are those that are easily tradable across the internet and do not require
major involvement by the employer. Then I show that services flow mainly from
developing countries to developed countries, but that developed countries are still
home to a significant share of freelancing. Next, I show that some markets are
1The copy I got was did not contain sensitive individual details such as contact and payment infor-
mation, which are also unnecessary for this research.
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thicker than others in terms of the number of bids per project. Thick markets are
relatively easier for freelancers to enter than thin markets. Lastly, employers do
not view freelancers as perfect substitutes of labor services: the winning quote is
higher than the lowest quote in 40-60% of the projects. This pattern is especially
noticeable in types of jobs that are more sensitive to quality.
In the second part of the paper, I analyze how employers use the freelancers’
country as a signal for their quality. One could view employers as importers
who buy services from exporting freelancers. For international trade in goods,
many studies show how consumers frequently ascribe a higher quality to products
imported from some countries relative to others and are willing to pay more for
them.2 In the context of labor markets, this relates to the large literature on
discrimination where, instead of gender or race, country of origin defines groups
employers discriminate between.
I document differential hiring of freelancers based on their country of origin
in two ways. First, I look at how country and personal reputation interact and
show that employers put more weight on the country of origin when no individual
reputation is available. As an example, American employers are 17 percentage
points less likely to hire a Bangladeshi freelancer than a Canadian freelancer.
However, the gap disappears for Bangladeshi and Canadian freelancers with 100
good reviews.
Second, I delve into how experience in the market changes employers’ percep-
tion of country quality. I follow employers and record the number of good and
bad experiences they had with freelancers from each country prior to the current
job they seek to fill. I show that employers are more likely to hire freelancers
from countries they have better experience with. Additionally, as employers gain
more experience, the relationship between the marginal experience and future
projects’ hiring decisions becomes weaker, since each new observation on a spe-
cific freelancer’s quality adds relatively less information on the whole distribution
of quality in their country.
2For a relatively recent review of the empirical literature on country-of-origin effects on demand, see
Dinnie (2004).
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Specifically, the first good experience that an employer had with a certain coun-
try increases the likelihood of another freelancer from the same country to be hired
in a future project by this same employer by 0.2 percentage points. After 10 good
experiences, though, the next good experience increases the probability by only
0.1 percentage point.
All these findings are consistent with statistical – rather than purely taste-
based – discrimination. Statistical discrimination is related to how employers
predict quality of service from freelancers’ countries (see Phelps (1972); Arrow
(1973)) while taste-based discrimination identifies employers preferences as the
source of differential treatment (see Becker (1957)).
Previous empirical work has documented discrimination and tried to identify
the type of discrimination. Bertrand and Mullainathan (2004) is an audit study
that uses the interaction of other signals with race to see if they change the rela-
tive importance of race, Altonji and Pierret (2001) uses wage dynamics from lon-
gitudinal data, and List (2004) uses a series of experiments complementing each
other. However, no study followed employers’ repeated hiring decisions following
their experience with previous hires. This paper contributes to the literature of
statistical discrimination by showing the relationship between specific paths of
experience in the market and subsequent hiring behavior.
Three characteristics of this unique dataset allow me to document how behav-
ior dynamically evolves according to an employer’s experience: First, complete
project history allows me to follow employers from the first project until the most
recent one. Second, project outcome is partially observable allowing me to classify
past projects as successes or failures. Finally, many employers receive bids from
freelancers hailing from countries the employers probably never had contact with.
Thus, every project’s outcome should have a heavier weight in the determination
of beliefs over productivity.
Even though online labor markets are relatively new markets, they have al-
ready been studied in several contexts related to job search and matching. Pallais
(2010) conducts an experiment on oDesk, a competing platform, where she hires
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freelancers randomly and measures the contribution of freelancer experience (and
reputation) to the propensity to be hired later. Stanton and Thomas (2011) exam-
ine how freelancers can increase their likelihood to be hired if they join a network
of freelancers that has a reputation based on the network members’ experience.
In the context of online international trade in goods, Hu and Wang (2010) show
how consumers are willing to pay different amounts for identical products sold by
retailers from different countries on eBay.
The implications of my findings to international trade in services and growth
of developing countries is important to note. Wage gaps between rich and poor
countries persist partly because labor cannot freely move between them due to
immigration restrictions imposed by rich countries.3 Online platforms allow de-
veloping countries to export labor services, but the ability to penetrate foreign
markets depends on the perception of the quality of these services in the importing
economies. Chisik (2003) shows how initial differences in country-level reputation
can become self-fulfilling through product specialization, due to an endogenously
created reputational comparative advantage that can eventually determine the
whole industrial structure of a country.
The paper is constructed as follows: Section 2 constitutes the first part that
describes main patterns of trade on freelancer.com. Section 3 is the second part of
the analysis. It describes the empirical strategy, dataset construction and reports
preliminary results. Finally, section 4 concludes.
2 Employers and Freelancers Matching through Free-
lancer.com
Trade on freelancer.com is organized around projects. A project is posted to
the website by an employer looking for freelancers. Freelancers then bid on the
project, quoting price for the service and specifying an estimate of the number of
3See Clemens (2011) for a survey of several studies on the gains of lifting international migration
barriers.
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days to completion. Projects on freelancer.com are almost always traded in full:
the whole service needed is described upfront and bids are made for the comple-
tion of the project, rather than for an hourly or weekly wage.4 The website allows
employers to pay freelancers through an escrow service, thereby guaranteeing a
higher level of security.5 Figures 7 and 8 in Appendix A show a list of recent
projects and a list of bids on a project randomly selected.
This section provides descriptive statistics of overall activity on the website. I
break down activity from different angles, to describe the setting in which em-
ployers and freelancers operate and to show in what ways this platform is home
to multiple global labor markets. Overall, since the launch of the website in 2004
– 945,688 projects were posted and matches accounted for the transfers of more
than $60 million dollars in exchange for services provided. 6
2.1 What Kinds of Services are Traded?
To reduce search costs, projects are tagged with job-types, or skills. The website
offers 385 job types grouped into nine categories. A project can be classified with
up to five job-types. Figure 1 shows the evolution of the nine categories over
time since the inception of the platform and the stock of projects at the time the
database was copied. Table 1 lists the top five job-types within each of the top five
categories.
The distribution of projects by categories and jobs shows that the more popu-
lar types of services are indeed more tradable. The extent to which a task is trad-
able varies. Some tasks like childcare are simply non-tradable: they require the
physical presence of the service provider near the seller. But even those that are
tradable require different degrees of freelancer’s tacit knowledge or employer in-
volvement, and different abilities to assess freelancers’ quality before hiring them.
4A job can be defined as “full time” and then bids can be made for hourly or weekly wages, but it is
quite rare on the platform. More recently, contests were added as an additional form of outsourcing
termed crowd-sourcing. However, no contests were available the time span for which I have the data.
5The fee for paying through the website is 10% of the total value of the transaction. Fee for full-time
job is a fixed fee charged only in the first payment.
6Numbers are true as of February 14, 2011 at 4:00pm EST.
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For example, data entry tasks can be simple and straightforward, which makes it
relatively easy to screen suitable freelancers, and have them independently com-
plete the task. Conversely, designing a new machine requires extensive knowledge
in engineering that is also harder to assess in advance, and also requires more
extensive communications between the service provider and the buyer.
Figure 1: The distribution of projects by category: flows and stocks.
(a) Number of new projects in a month, February 2004-January 2011.
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Table 1: Top 5 jobs in each of the top-5 categories
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Indeed, the most popular job types – website construction, writing, design,
data entry and bulk marketing – all fit relatively well into the story of posting
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a well-defined project, finding the most cost-beneficial provider and letting them
complete the job wherever they are with relatively low involvement required from
the service buyer.
Job types define labor markets. They are roughly defined along the lines of
skills or occupations that freelancers possess. Moreover, freelancers are required
to choose a set of job types they have the skills to work in.7 Labor market thick-
ness – the number of applicants per job – varies across job types. Table 2 lists the
thickest and thinnest labor markets. Some markets exhibit a very high level of
competition between freelancers. A project flagged with “Excel” has 42 freelancers
bidding on average. By contrast, projects requiring iPhone related work get 10
freelancers bidding on average.
Table 2: Thickest and thinnest job types among markets with at least 3,000
projects
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A very salient difference between thick and thin markets is the amount of in-
vestment required to enter the market. Most thin markets require either high and
specific human capital (programming and mobile) or marketing infrastructure (e.g
mailing lists and customer databases). In contrast, thick markets are mainly data
entry and design services which most of them do not require great investments
and are therefore more open for entry. Of course, thickness depends on demand
factors as well – iPhone jobs are in higher demand than Web Search jobs – but
from looking at the numbers of projects in both the thick and thin jobs, it does
7Technically this set of job types restrict freelancers to bid only on projects flagged with one of these
job types. Additionally, they are also subscribed to emails announcing new jobs posted within each
job type they assign themselves to.
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not look like there’s a systematic difference in demand.
2.2 Where are Services Demanded and Supplied?
Employers and freelancers from all over the world log on to the website. Upon
signing up to the website they are required to fill in their country of residence
and optionally additional geographic and other personal details.8 Figure 2 plots
the main city-level flows of services traded through the website. Aggregate at the
country level, Figure 3 shows amounts earned and sent over the platform (surface
on map), as well as total net exports (map color).
Figure 2: City-level flows of services
Note: the green part of every curved line stands for the origin of the service while the red part of the line stands for
the destination. All city-pairs with overall project volume of at least $3500 are given a line in width proportional to
the volume of trade.
8It is possible to report a country-of-residence falsely, but freelancer is undertaking several verifi-
cation procedures to fight fraudulent abuse of the system, especially when a payment is involved.
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Figure 3: Geographical distribution of net exports and money paid and earned
(a) Country size inflated by total USD paid
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(b) Country size inflated by total USD earned
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Note: green color indicates positive net exports while red color indicates negative net exports.
Looking at the maps, a few patterns are worth mentioning: First, services flow
mainly from developing to developed countries. Net exporters on the website –
countries in green – are mainly located in Asia, Eastern Europe, Africa and Latin
America. Net importers are mainly USA, UK, Australia, New Zealand and West-
ern Europe. Second, countries with a larger proportion of English speakers are
more active, both in terms of posting projects – UK, USA, Canada, Australia and
New Zealand inflated disproportionately more than other non-English speaking
OECD members – and in terms of being selected to do the job – India, Egypt and
the Philippines disproportionately more active than comparable countries such as
China, Morocco and Thailand. Lastly, we see that not all projects are awarded
to freelancers from developing countries: some developed countries, mainly the
United States and Britain, are also significant suppliers of services (Figure 3b).
Similarly on the other side of the market, employers from India, Pakistan and
Bangladesh post a non-negligible number of project as well.
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2.3 Quotes, Prices and Wages
Employers purchasing services would like to minimize the cost of the service,
but are aware of differences in quality among providers. Thus, employers do not
always select the bid with the lowest quote. In fact, the last column in Table 3
shows that only between 40 and 60 percent of the winning bids quoted the lowest
price among all bids for the project. The rest of the bids won despite having
another bid with a lower quote. Additionally, Table 3 reports average quote ranges
for projects in selected job types.
Projects can be quite different in scope and magnitude, even within job types.
However, one can see that tasks in the Mobile Phones & Computing category
have relatively high quote ranges. Compared to Virtual Assistant jobs that start
at almost $70 and winning bids quote $105 per project on average, iPhone and
Android jobs start at around $400 and winners on average earn around $600
per project. Moreover, since quality is relatively more important, only 40% of the
projects that match choose the bid with the lowest quote.
Employers in developed countries will find the prices on freelancer.com much
lower than those that local companies quote. A programmer is making on aver-
age $36/hr and a data entry keyer is making $13.6/hr on average.9 In India, a
programmer makes between $1 and $6/hr while a data entry operator is making
between $0.6 and $2.5/hr.10
On the website, it is not straightforward to infer wages from total revenues un-
less we know for sure that the freelancer is self-employed and has no employees.
But assuming all freelancers are working alone, taking the number of days a free-
lancer who won a project promises to complete it as a rough estimate of how long
it actually takes, the column before last of Table 3 shows the implied daily wage of
a freelancer who won a project on average. Assuming a work day of eight hours,
we see that programmers make roughly $8/hr, which is between the Indian and
the American wage. Engineering freelancers earn $10/hr, probably due to higher
9Source: Occupational Employment and Wages, May 2010.
10Source: “Salary Snapshot for Software Engineer / Developer / Programmer Jobs” and “Salary
Snapshot for Data Entry Operator Jobs”, payscale.com
11
human capital required for these jobs.11
Table 3: Average quotes ranges and winning bids’ premia over the lowest bid for
selected job types
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2.4 Repeated Activity and Trade
Having seen labor markets form and facilitate matches across international bor-
ders it is interesting to look at the distribution of activity across individuals. As
in many other markets and activities, a relatively small number of agents are re-
sponsible for a large share of total activity. This statistical skewness for employers
and freelancers is shown in Figure 4.
Specifically, 64% of employers in the system posted only one project.12 But
11One unexpected result is the high implied-wage in Data Entry and Data Processing jobs. A possible
explanation is that such jobs can easily be divided between more than one person who can work in
parallel, unlike programming or design jobs. If this is the case, then the revenue-per-day measure is
more likely to represent the sum of two or more wages.
12Employers in the system are all users who have posted at least one project.
12
their projects account for only 17% of all projects on the website. On the other side
of the distribution, 7% of employers posted 10 projects or more, which account
for 56% of the projects. These repeatedly posting employers provide the variation
in experience required in the analysis of learning in the second part of this paper.
Freelancers show an even more skewed distribution of placing bids. The top 1%
of freelancers in terms of placing bids – those who bid for at least 251 projects – are
responsible for 46% of the bids. The reason for this difference in the distribution
may lie in the different cost of bidding on, relative to posting, a project.
Figure 4: Distribution of activity across employers and freelancers
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Note: Similar to a Lorenz curve, the horizontal axis has the bottom p percent of the population while the vertical axis
has the share of activity created by this bottom p percent. The 45º line represents the curve had each agent created
the same number of activities.
Table 4 looks at repeated employer activity by job-type. In table 4a the average
number of projects an employer posts is reported. Some job-types have employers
posting more projects on average than others. Writing and content is one category
where employers repeatedly post. Since projects in this category sometimes need
to be done repeatedly and some of them are also relatively smaller, the average
employer posts between four to five projects. This is not true for job types in the
bottom panel of the table that tackle more basic challenges of a business, such as
designing templates or adding eCommerce capabilities to a website. These skills
13
are needed less frequently by the same employer.
Table 4: Repeated posting and hiring of the same freelancer
(a) Repeated posting of projects within a job-type
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(b) Employers hiring freelancers previously hired by them
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Lastly, what is the share of projects that is given by employers to freelancers
who have already done business with them before? If employers are satisfied and
need an additional project to be done, we expect them to hire the same freelancer
if the latter is available. On average, roughly 8% of all projects (excluding the
first project of every employer) are won by freelancers who were already awarded
another project by the employer in the past. The share of projects that rehire
previously-hired freelancers differs by job type.
The top-10 jobs in rehiring, as Table 4b shows, are mainly more complicated
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development projects. These are projects where quality is very important and
harder to detect before the project is delivered. Therefore employers will tend to
work with freelancers they have already worked with in the past and are satisfied
with.
The bottom jobs in terms of rehiring are mainly writing jobs. Writing skills
can easily be detected by a short trial and therefore employers are more likely to
experiment with new freelancers instead of being locked in by previous freelancers
even if they were good. At the same time, some of them may inherently require
different freelancers to do different projects the same employer offers (e.g forum
posting, reviews and blog posts).
3 Measuring Statistical Discrimination and Learn-
ing: Empirical Strategy and Data
In this section I describe two avenues for studying the inference employers make
on freelancers based on their country of origin. The first explores how information
on country and personal reputation interact. The second focuses on the dynamics
of how employers learn from previous experience.
To test the hypotheses in this section I restrict attention to projects flagged
with “PHP” job type posted in 2010. PHP is a programming language that allows
web servers to send customized pages to the website’s visitors. This is a very
common programming language on the web. Even prominent websites like face-
book.com and freelancer.com itself use PHP. By focusing on a single market – the
largest on freelancer.com – I avoid combining different labor markets with differ-
ent characteristics such as how sensitive the service is to quality or how hard it
is to detect it ex ante. It also makes the analysis easier computationally. Each
observation in my dataset is a bid on a project. An observation contains project,
bid, freelancer, and employer details as they appear in the original database. An
indicator of whether the bid was selected by the employer will be our dependent
variable of interest.
15
3.1 Individual Reputation vs. Country Reputation
Freelancers on the website differ on a whole range of characteristics. In addition
to the freelancer’s country, other details are visible on a user profile. Moreover,
after each project the employer and freelancer rate each other on a 0-to-10 scale.
If both employer and freelancer rated each other, these ratings become public.
Perhaps the most prominent feature a freelancer and an employer may have to
credibly signal their quality is the average, and number of, ratings.
How does this individual reputation mechanism interact with the country-of-
origin signal? If discrimination would have been taste-based, individual reputa-
tion should not change the likelihood to be hired, since the disutility from em-
ploying a freelancer in a certain country is independent of productivity. Unlike
statistical discrimination, taste-based discrimination is not the outcome of lack of
information. If there is at least some component of statistical discrimination then
when more credible signals of individual ability are available the country should
matter less.
Since reviews do not become public if one of the sides does not review the other,
those who expect bad reviews usually do not rate the other side and make the
review “expired.” Thus, the distribution of public average ratings is concentrated
around the 10-out-of-10, as Figure 5 shows.13 Even though average ratings is
almost always very close to 10, the number of reviews signal both quality and
experience in the market. Thus, I restrict attention to the number of reviews.
13Note, however, that the website has unpublished reputation available and I can observe them. This
will become important for the exercise in 3.2.
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Figure 5: The Distribution of Average and Number of Ratings
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1. Distributions plotted for all freelancers bidding on PHP projects in 2010, weighted by the number of bids.
To complete the exercise described below, I supplement the dataset with ad-
ditional variables used for the analysis. First, I reconstruct freelancer reputation
to have the number of publicly observable ratings at the time the bid was made.14
Second, I reconstruct the number of previous matches made between the em-
ployer and the freelancer prior to posting the project.
I estimate the employer’s demand for freelancers as a function of the number
of reviews, price, and previous matches between the employer and freelancer.
To capture differential hiring probability by country I let the constant and the
regression coefficient on the number of reviews be country-specific, as equation
(1) shows:15
wonbp =
∑
c∈C
γccbp +
∑
c∈C
βccbp × ln (1 + reviewsbp) + δ ln pricebp + λpastProjbp (1)
+
∑
p∈P
φp + εbp
where cbp is a dummy that equals 1 if the freelancer is from country c, φp are
project fixed effects, γc are the country fixed effects, and βc measures, for country
14I am able to do so thanks to the fact that each review completed for the agent is saved individually
with the date of submission.
15I choose a linear probability model for computational ease. For now I am interested in the signs of
the coefficients rather than the accurate point estimate.
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c, the return to each additional 1% reviews.
One must also take into account how ln pricebp is determined. A freelancer sets
price so that it will maximize the expected revenue from bidding and provide ex-
post positive profits. Conditional on a freelancer’s country of origin and publicly
available individual reputation, the freelancer will trade off a high quote for lower
probability to win. When a new review becomes available the freelancer will likely
increase the price quoted. Additionally, price may be correlated with other char-
acteristics that I am not capturing but may also be correlated with winning the
bid. I therefore need a “supply” shifter: a factor that determines pricing but does
not affect the likelihood to be selected other than through the price.
I use fluctuations in the exchange rates to the U.S dollar as an instrument.
Quotes on the website are virtually always given in U.S dollars. The exchange rate
between the dollar and the local currency should affect the offered price because
freelancers’ costs and alternative income sources are mostly denominated in their
local currency. Thus, when the local currency devalues – when each dollar is now
worth more in the local currency – the freelancer can bid lower than otherwise
and still get the same amount in local terms. The exchange rate is excluded from
the demand equation if I restrict attention to American employers. Since their
local currency is the U.S dollar their decision is unaffected by the cost side of the
freelancer in ways that are not operating through the quoted price. Thus, the the
supply equation will be:
ln pricebp =
∑
c∈C
αccbp +
∑
c∈C
θccbp × ln (1 + reviewsbp) + ϕpastProjbp (2)
+ ξexRatebp +
∑
p∈P
φp + ν
where exRatebp is an exchange rate index a moving average of the exchange rate
between the freelancer’s country’s currency and the U.S. dollar, normalized to the
average exchange rate in December 2009. Figure 9 in Appendix A shows how this
index evolves over 2010 for selected currencies.
If discrimination is taking place, then first we need to see that at least for un-
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rated freelancers, those who live in some countries are significantly more likely
to be hired than those from other countries. In other words, and if we as-
sume discrimination is favoring freelancers from developed countries, I expect
γdeveloping < γdeveloped. If discrimination is at least in part statistical, then more
information on the ability of an individual should decrease the gap in the likeli-
hood to be hired. Therefore the coefficients for individual reputation should switch
sides: βdeveloping > βdeveloped, so that as individual reputation is better the gap in
the prediction of the likelihood to be hired will decrease.
Results
Figure 6 summarizes the findings: Bangladeshi and Vietnamese freelancers with
no reviews are much less likely to be hired relative to Canadian or Australian
freelancers. However, as freelancers earn good ratings the difference slowly de-
creases until it disappears. The regressions are reported in Table 5. Column
(1) shows that better individual reputation as well as having already worked for
the employer in the past are positively correlated with being selected. Prices are
negatively associated with the probability to be hired. This coefficient captures a
bias caused by freelancers endogenously choosing price so as to not decrease the
probability to be hired by too much. Once we use the IV approach, in column (4),
the coefficient increases dramatically.
Looking at the coefficients on country dummies (γc) in column (4) we can see a
clear ranking of countries: all countries have a negative coefficient meaning that
unrated American freelancers are preferred by American employers to all other
freelancers. Still, all three developed countries that are not the U.S lie above the
rest of the countries. As for the slope of individual reputation, for most countries it
is not statistically significant. However, the point estimates are mostly in line with
an opposite ordering (relative to the country dummies). Moreover, Bangladesh
is the country with the highest slope, that is also statistically and economically
higher than the American slope, and the lowest coefficient on the dummy.
19
Figure 6: Country vs. individual reputation: a graphical representation
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This figure plots the effects from Table 5 for selected countries.
3.2 Employers Learning from Experience
The previous section detected evidence for statistical discrimination. I would like
to show how employers form their opinions, or beliefs, about the average free-
lancer from country c.
Employers beliefs about the distribution of skills within a group they can iden-
tify are at the core of the theory of statistical discrimination. But where do these
beliefs originate from? Following examples from Ellsberg (1961), consider two
urns – one for each country – with “good”- and “bad”-marked balls. Each ball
represents a freelancer that can either be of a “good” or a “bad” type, where “good”
types yield higher revenues to the employer. The employer needs to decide which
urn to take a ball from. The decision will depend on her belief of the proportion of
“good” and “bad” balls within each urn.
However, if the employer is repeatedly taking out balls from an urn, she can
infer the proportion of “good” balls in the urn. If the employer is American, she
20
may have a good idea of the proportion in the American urn from prior experi-
ences with American freelancers, but having no prior experience with freelancers
from Bangladesh, her prior beliefs on the proportion of “good” types is not clear.16
Therefore, each good or bad experience with the Bangladeshi freelancer is ex-
pected to have a significant effect on the employer’s choice next time she faces
a Bangladeshi freelancer. This intuition is more formally laid out as a simple
dynamic problem in Appendix B.
Three features of employers on freelancer.com make them good candidates for
the task of documenting how market experience affects subsequent observable
behavior through learning: First, employers are observed hiring multiple times.
This means that if they learn from their experience in one project, they should
behave differently in subsequent projects and observing all their projects allows
to detect such changes in behavior. After taking a “bad” ball from the Bangladeshi
urn, is the employer more likely to go for the other urn or try another ball from
the same urn?
Second, employers’ experience gained from a project, in the form of service
satisfaction, is at least partially observable. The reviews freelancers and employers
fill on each other, project cancellations, filings of disputes on the website, and
timely payments are all signs of either good or bad outcomes. In other words, I
observe whether the ball the employer takes out of the urn is “good” or “bad.”
Third, most employers are likely to have no prior experience with freelancers
from developing countries, which makes every project – at least in the beginning
– a significant learning experience. If employers already had a long history of
trading with individuals from the freelancer’s country before, the specific project
that I as a researcher observe its outcome would be only one event in a long list
of experiences with that country and therefore shouldn’t have changed employers’
beliefs about agents from that country by much.
To implement this idea I assign each freelancer the prior experience that the
16Actually, she may have a good idea on the general population of Americans, but not on those who
self-select to this platform. With the unfamiliar country I can assume that she does not know much
about either the general population’s or the self-selected population’s proportion of “good” types.
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employer had with freelancers from this freelancer’s country before posting the
project. Experience is captured in two variables: number of good outcomes and
bad outcomes. I use employers’ ratings of freelancers, projects cancellations and
disputes initiated by employers to classify past projects of each employer to “good”
and “bad”. For the classification of project outcome I take both publicly observable
and publicly-unavailable reviews. Unlike public ratings, many non-public reviews
are bad.
A good outcome is defined as a perfect review (=10) as rated by the employer.
A bad outcome is defined as one of the following three: bad reviews given by the
employer (≤ 5), a project for which the employer initiated a dispute-resolution
request, or a project that the employer canceled.17
I estimate the following regression:
wonbp = α+ β ln (1 + reviewsbp) + δ ln pricebp + λpastProjbp (3)
+ ηgoodgoodExp
c
bp + ηgoodbadExp
c
bp + ηgood2
(
goodExpcbp
)2
+ ηbad2
(
badExpcbp
)2
+ ηgoodbadgoodExp
c
bp × badExpcbp +
∑
p∈P
φp + εbp
The partial derivatives implied by this functional form are, for good experi-
ences:
∂won
∂goodExp
= ηgood + 2ηgood2goodExp+ ηgoodbadbadExp (4)
and symmetrically for bad experiences. Thus, following the first implication of the
model, I expect that ηbad < 0 < ηgood, since in absence of prior experience, if the
first experience with country c is good (bad) then we expect the employer to be
more (less) likely to hire another freelancer from c the next project. We also expect
ηgood2, the coefficient on the quadratic term, to be negative since if we have more
and more experiences that are good, the marginal good experience will update
our beliefs upwards less and less. Our beliefs have already formed. The sign on
ηgoodbad should depend on the number of good and bad experiences.
17Note that according to this classification, some projects will be not categorized as either good or
bad. I do not count them in my measures of good and bad experience as I cannot classify them.
22
Table 6 reports the regressions in question. Even though the OLS specifi-
cations in columns (1)-(3) yields coefficients all in line with the hypotheses, the
preferred specifications are the IV specifications: (7)-(9). Indeed, if we just look
at a linear specification in column (7) then every 10 good experiences contribute
0.6 percentage points to the likelihood of hiring another freelancer from the same
country, while every 10 bad experiences decrease this likelihood by 0.3 percentage
points. These are not very large numbers economically.
Once we try the full quadratic specification we get that the first good experience
with a freelancer from country c increases the probability of hiring another one
from c in the next project by 0.26 percentage points. The effect of a first bad
experience, however, is not statistically significant, and the point estimate is even
positive in contrast to what we would expect.
4 Conclusion
Employers’ search for employees has always been a careful process in which
employers try to infer the expected productivity of prospects. Traditionally, the
search for prospective employees was geographically concentrated near the em-
ployer. The rise of the Internet allowed online marketplaces such as freelancer.com
to evolve and facilitate search for freelancers anywhere on the globe. Even the
smallest employer can now exploit wage gaps between rich and poor countries to
reduce its labor costs significantly. Online labor markets make matching between
employers and employees less costly and less locally biased. Wherever they are,
employers and freelancers on the website are as far as a click of a mouse from
each other. If some labor services can be provided remotely, and if an employee
in a developing country is a good-enough substitute for a developed-country em-
ployee, then economic theory predicts that employers from developed countries
will hire more freelancers from developing countries. In the long run, at least for
these services, the wage gap between rich and poor countries should decrease and
labor markets should be less geographically segregated.
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It is nevertheless unclear to what extent labor markets can integrate globally
through such online platforms. Employers can find much cheaper labor services
in new economies, but they are also entering new and unfamiliar domains where
employees are harder to screen for productivity, quality, and trustworthiness,
given their different observable characteristics, or lack thereof. Indeed, this paper
showed a country-of-origin effect for freelancers on the website. It also showed
how individual reputation may alleviate the country-of-origin effect. Lastly, it
showed that some learning by employers is taking place: they respond mainly to
good outcomes by hiring more freelancers from the same country of freelancers
they had successful matches with.
Different implications for policy arise if statistical discrimination stems from
employers not knowing the distribution of skills in the freelancer’s country, or if
employers know the distribution and it is inferior. If the main problem is ambigu-
ity – employers not knowing the distribution of skills – more accurate and credible
information should be disseminated to employers. If, on the other hand, it is
objective differences in the distribution of productivity or quality, then additional
screening by the platform that will guarantee higher average quality may help the
ones who get clearance build up reputation and provide positive externalities to
all potential service exporters in the way Chisik (2003) describes.
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A Additional Figures
Figure 7: Browsing newest projects on freelancer.com: a range of jobs awaiting to
be filled.
Note: Accessed in November, 2010
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Figure 8: Bids on a random project: a range of freelancers to choose from.
Note: Accessed in November, 2010
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Figure 9: Selected exchange rate fluctuations in 2010
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B Modeling the Employer’s Decision
Since learning and statistical discrimination are concepts that have been used in
more than one context and setup in economics I am going to lay out a simple
model of how employers experiment with freelancers of unfamiliar countries and
learn about employees from these countries as they gain experience with them in
the market.
Suppose there is one risk-neutral employer serially posting projects: hiring a
freelancer, observing the outcome of the project and then posts another project.
On each project two new freelancers place a bid: one from a known country (k)
and one from an unknown country (u). There are only these two countries in the
market. The freelancers quote two constant wages: wk and wu for the known-
and unknown-country freelancers respectively. Assume that pk − wk > 0 so that
the employer will always hire a freelancer.18 Freelancers can either be “good”
types or “bad” types. Good and bad types yield revenue q normalized to 1 and
18Only the employer’s behavior is modeled here. Freelancer behavior is not modeled here. The
analysis will be equivalent if it wasn’t an employer but a consumer deciding between buying an apple
from a known brand or an apple from an unknown brand.
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0 respectively. Thus, each project’s ex ante payoff to the employer from hiring
freelancer i is:
pii = Eqi − wi (5)
Assume that the proportion of good types in the known country is known and
denoted by pk. In contrast, the proportion of good types in the unknown market is
unknown and is subjectively distributed according to pu ∼ Fu. This means that the
employer is uncertain about both candidates, but the unknown-country candidate
introduces a second layer of uncertainty: ambiguity regarding the distribution of
the good-vs.-bad types in the country. Thus, the ex ante payoff for the known-
and unknown-countries’ freelancers is:
pik = pk − wk , piu = E [pu|Ωt]− wu (6)
where Ωt is the information the employer at the time she makes the decision for
project t.
Experience, embodied in Ωt is the only difference between projects. After each
project the employer learns about the hired freelancer’s type, and therefore Ωt will
be the number of good and bad types in the unknown country.19,20 Thus, we can
rewrite (6) in more tangible terms:
pik = pk − wk , piu = E [pu|ng, nb]− wu (7)
where ng and nb are the number of good and bad freelancers from the unknown
country.
Experience makes the employer’s decision more informed. Therefore a forward
looking employer thinks about her information in future projects when deciding
whether to hire a freelancer from an unknown country presently. We can write
19For the sake of simplicity I assume that for the known country the employer does not keep track
of good and bad experience. This is equivalent to having a long record of trading with freelancers
from the known country, thereby making the projects I observe negligible in the formation of beliefs
on known-country freelancers.
20I also assume that the proportion of good types does not change with time, and therefore the order
of good and bad experiences does not matter for the inference of pu.
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the dynamic problem as a Bellman equation:
V (ng, nb) = max {pk − wk , E [pu|ng, nb]− wu}+ βEV
(
n
′
g, n
′
b
)
(8)
where the laws of motion for n
′
g and n
′
b are:
n
′
g = ng + I {ci = u} × I {qi = 1} (9)
n
′
b = nb + I {ci = u} × I {qi = 0}
Lemma 1. If the employer hires a known-country freelancer at time t then she will
hire a known-country freelancers for all τ > t as well. The value of hiring locally –
present and future payoffs aggregated – is then pk−wk1−β .
Proof. note that if the employer hires a known-country freelancer, I {ci = u} = 0,
then V
(
n
′
g, n
′
b
)
= V (ng, nb). Thus, the problem will be identical the next period
because no further experience with the unknown-country freelancers was gained.
Therefore in each period after t the employer solves the same problem and gets the
same policy: hire a known-country freelancer. Since this is the case, each period’s
payoff from that period on is equal to pk − wk and therefore
∑∞
t=0 β
t (pk − wk) =
pk−wk
1−β
Thus, I can simplify (8) and get:21
V (ng, nb) = max
{
pk − wk
1− β , p̂u − wu + β [p̂uV (ng + 1, nb) + (1− p̂u)V (ng, nb + 1)]
}
(10)
where p̂u = p̂u (ng, nb) ≡ E (pu|ng, nb). This equation embodies the tradeoff that the
employer faces: experimenting with unknown-country freelancers may yield better
21Note that
EV
(
n
′
g , n
′
b
)
= EFu
[
E
[
V
(
n
′
g , n
′
b
)∣∣∣ pu]] = E [puV (ng + 1, nb) + (1− pu)V (ng , nb + 1)]
= V (ng + 1, nb)E [pu] + V (ng , nb + 1)E [1− pu]
= V (ng + 1, nb)E [pu] + V (ng , nb + 1) [1− E [pu]]
= V (ng + 1, nb) p̂u + V (ng , nb + 1) (1− p̂u)
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continuation value if the experience is good. The probability that this experience
will, indeed, be good, depends on the current best guess of what the proportion of
good employees in the unknown country is.
What will determine the dynamics is how the expected value of the subjective
distribution of the proportion will change with good and bad experiences. In other
words, the function p̂u (ng, nb). I assume that employers follow Bayesian rules in
updating their subjective distributions. The final nail will be to choose the prior
subjective distribution.
Agresti and Hitchcock (2005) surveys possible priors proposed for binomial
distributions. One plausible prior could be U (0, 1), assigning equal probability
for each possible pu. When that is the case, the posterior distribution’s expected
value is:
p̂u (ng, nb) =
ng + 1
ng + nb + 2
Even if the prior is not U (0, 1), assume that ∂p̂u∂nb < 0 <
∂p̂u
∂ng
. This means that ev-
ery good experience increases the expected quality of the unknown country while
every bad experience decreases it.
First testable prediction: Employers are more (less) likely to hire freelancers
from the unknown country after a good (bad) experience than before it.
Second testable prediction: As the employer earns a higher “stock” of experi-
ences, the change in hiring likelihood induced by each additional experience is
smaller.
Both employer and freelancer Canadian
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Table 5: Country vs. individual reputation: Country-of-origin effects for rated and
unrated freelancers
OLS OLS OLS IV
(1) (2) (3) (4)
-0.076 *** -0.075 *** -0.076 *** -0.566 ***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.115)
0.020 *** 0.021 *** 0.024 *** 0.045 ***
(0.000) (0.001) (0.002) (0.005)
0.020 ** 0.020 ** 0.026 *** 0.021 ***
(0.009) (0.009) (0.006) (0.001)
Freelancers from:
Have matched in the past once
ln(number of reviews + 1)
Quote in $
Un
ite
d 
Kin
gd
om
All U.S employers ONLY
from the UK? 0.004 -0.007 -0.036 ***
(0.004) (0.007) (0.012)
UK X ln(reviews + 1) 0.010 *** 0.008 * 0.003
(0.003) (0.005) (0.005)
Ca
na
da
from Canada? 0.005 0.011 -0.013
(0.006) (0.010) (0.014)
Canada X ln(reviews + 1) -0.002 -0.007 -0.012
(0.004) (0.007) (0.008)
Au
str
alia
from Australia? 0.008 -0.020 -0.054 ***
(0.008) (0.013) (0.019)
Australia X ln(reviews + 1) 0.035 *** 0.027 ** -0.006
(0.007) (0.011) (0.012)
Ind
ia
from India? -0.037 *** -0.044 *** -0.080 ***
(0.002) (0.003) (0.010)
India X ln(reviews + 1) -0.003 ** -0.004 * -0.002
(0.001) (0.002) (0.002)
Pa
kis
tan
from Pakistan? -0.036 *** -0.042 *** -0.100 ***
(0.003) (0.004) (0.015)
Pakistan X ln(reviews + 1) -0.001 -0.002 0.003
(0.001) (0.002) (0.003)
Ba
ng
lad
es
h from Bangladesh? -0.044 *** -0.051 *** -0.180 ***(0.003) (0.005) (0.031)
Bangladesh X ln(reviews + 1) 0.001 0.001 0.018 ***
(0.002) (0.003) (0.005)
Vie
tna
m
from Vietnam? -0.013 ** -0.028 *** -0.127 ***
(0.005) (0.008) (0.025)
Vietnam X ln(reviews + 1) -0.007 *** -0.009 *** 0.004
(0.002) (0.003) (0.005)
All
 
oth
er
 
no
n-
US
 
co
un
trie
s is other? -0.020 *** -0.034 *** -0.101 ***(0.002) (0.004) (0.016)
other X ln(reviews + 1) 0.009 *** 0.010 *** 0.006 **
(0.001) (0.002) (0.003)
336,556 336,556 137,619 137,398
26,447 26,447 11,218 11,215
Observations
Project Fixed Effects
Notes:
1. The omitted category is U.S-based freelancers. The coefficient of ln (reviews+ 1) in columns (2)-(4), therefore,
pertains to U.S freelancers as well.
2. “All other non-US countries” represents a grouping of all countries that are neither listed in the table nor the U.S
and treated as one country.
3. Quote in $ instrumented in column (4) using a moving average of exchange rate 15 days before through 15 days
after the day of the bid.
4. Sample restricted to PHP projects in 2010. Experience and other historical variables constructed for all skills and
time on the website.
5. Standard errors clustered at the project level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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